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ABSTRACT 
The article addresses social cohesion (SC) as a given political good in liberal 
democracies. It analyzes arguments based on SC by discussing a scientific and 
a political discourse on SC and the adjacent literature. The analysis identifies 
shared premises in conceptions and usage of SC, showing that the concept is 
both analytically flawed and highly normative. Next, it assesses the function 
of the concept in both discourses and argues that it raises problems for liberal 
democracy. The article concludes that SC clashes with several political values 




Artiklen adresserer social sammenhængskraft (SC) som et givet politisk gode 
i liberale demokratier. Den analyserer argumenter baseret på SC ved at 
portrættere en videnskabelig og en politisk diskurs om SC samt den tilknyt-
tede litteratur. Analysen identificerer delte præmisser i konceptualiseringer 
og brugen af SC, hvilket både viser, at begrebet er analytisk mangelfuldt og 
særdeles normativt. Derefter vurderer den begrebets funktion i begge 
diskurser og argumenterer for, at den rejser problemer for liberalt demokrati. 
Artiklen konkluderer, at SC kolliderer med adskillige politiske værdier i 
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Social cohesion (SC) is a protagonist in debates on social order (Jenson, 1998, 
p. 12; 2002, p. 146). Since the 1990s, academics have endorsed SC as the idea 
that globalization, immigration, and economic insecurity threaten social 
order, and recently The Economist (2010, p. 16) dubbed SC as something “all 
decent Europeans can sign up to”. According to conventional wisdom, SC 
peaks the top chart of political goods, and it appears to be an unquestioned 
and inarticulate given. These attributes are evident in a certain class of 
political arguments: If an issue is framed as an obstacle to SC, the issue eo ipso 
becomes politically deplorable since SC is deployed, often implicitly, as a 
good that trumps other concerns without further justification. In effect, the 
conclusions reached in such arguments are elevated beyond critique. I refer to 
such arguments as ‘SC arguments’. 
 
A recent example of this kind of reasoning is found after the eastward 
enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007, which allowed flows of workers, 
many of them unskilled, to migrate more freely in search of work. In countries 
such as Denmark, which now houses a growing number of Eastern European 
workers, the SC argument may proceed thus: These workers steal jobs from 
Danes and channel earnings back to their home countries. In so doing, they 
undermine the Danish societal cohesion, which depends on equally 
burdensome contributions to the state’s finances, as a result of which, 
enlargement of the EU is a bad idea that should be resisted. Clearly, the 
argument values Danish SC above European integration, but the point is that 
SC fuels several arguments that instantiate a similar reasoning and that these 
arguments occur as a trump card in contemporary politics. I focus on this 
class of arguments on a general level in relation to liberal democracy because 
SC arguments tend to occur in this setting. By ‘liberal democracy’ I 
understand a democracy in which typical liberal values, such as individual 
integrity and freedom of speech and choice, are widely recognized in the 
public and commonly practiced and protected by the state. 
 
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 shows that intertwined discourses 
from real politics and social science support the status of SC. Section 3 
portrays SC as a political good via a literature review, which may appear 
extensive but simply serves to outline the underlying premises of SC 
arguments. Section 4 evaluates the function and politics of SC in liberal 
democracy. Lastly, Section 5 concludes that SC arguments clash with several 
values of liberal democracy and that liberals should question the status of SC 
as a given political good as a result. 
 
This agenda means that I do not evaluate the soundness of specific SC 
arguments, as for example Holtug (2010) and Mantovan (2013) do with 
regards to immigration. Furthermore, it implies that I set aside specific 
debates in the political-philosophical literature in which SC has recently 
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played a major role (e.g. in multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism). Lastly, 
the chosen scope prevents me from addressing liberal replies to the problems 
posed by SC. 
 
2. Two discourses 
I discern two discourses of SC, one political and one scientific, in order to 
show that they share two premises, which are found in most SC arguments. 
The political discourse originated in the 1980s, prior to the scientific discourse, 
and may be defined as remarks and arguments that deploy, rely on, or 
assume SC in order to express a political preference (Jeannotte, 2000, p. 14). It 
is thus embodied by political agents – policymakers, officials, opinion leaders, 
etc. The scientific discourse may be defined as scholarly debates and works on 
SC in journals, academic books, and policy recommendations from research 
committees. It is thus comprised of scholars. The distinction is analytical, but I 
will later use it to show that both discourses are premised on ontological 
realism, i.e. on the idea that the referent of ‘SC’ literally exists. 
 
Ideally, SC should only appear normatively in the political discourse and 
descriptively in the scientific discourse (Duhaime et al., 2004, p. 301). Reality, 
however, is not ideal; as politics is increasingly premised on social science, 
and science is progressively more politicized, the discourses converge (Bond, 
2007, p. 898). The more political agents talk about SC, the more academics 
study it, and the more affirmative studies of the existence of SC, the stronger 
its political potency becomes. SC travels between the two discourses due to 
this reflexivity, partly benefitting from its scientific legitimacy (Bernard, 1999, 
p. 48), partly being discredited as ideology (Duhaime et al., 2004, p. 295). 
 
I will elaborate below on the characteristics of the discourses. Two 
observations cling to the political discourse. First, SC fuels ideologically 
opposite projects (Støvring, 2008, p. 93). Consider an example: For more than 
two decades (Pahl, 1991, p. 357), the European Commission (EC, 2004, p. 374) 
has held that SC “is vital to the full development and enduring success of the 
Union” whereas the Danish People’s Party (DPP, 2009, p. 44, my translation) – 
a critic of the EU par excellence – argues that “maintenance of social cohesion is 
[...] crucial to the survival of the welfare state”. Their policies are mutually 
exclusive, since the EC works towards a supranational EU, which undermines 
DPP’s project of restoring Denmark as a Westphalian nation-state. Yet both 
justify their policies in terms of SC. For example, the EU justifies its regional 
funds system for resource redistribution on account of its positive 
contribution to SC while DPP justifies its tough agenda on immigration in 
terms of immigration threatening to undermine SC. Nonetheless, SC surfaces 
as a given good in both cases. In addition, current political consensus holds 
that SC is threatened (Jeannotte, 2000, p. 11). The perception is thus that SC is 
decreasing, though there is some disagreement as to the causes, and since SC 
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is conceived as a social good, guarding it becomes a common policy issue. In 
this sense, a perception of threat is crucial to SC arguments. 
 
Next, I will turn to the scientific discourse, where one finds disagreement as 
to the causes of the threat. The literature predicates causation of globalization 
and/or modernity (Dickes, Valentova, and Borsenberger, 2010, p. 453; Jansen, 
Chioncel, and Dekkers, 2006, p. 190; Lafaye, 2009, p. 393). The scientific 
discourse thus shares the political belief that SC is threatened and conveys the 
idea that something precious is about to be lost, however obscure the 
referents ‘globalization’ and ‘modernity’ may be (Bly, 2005, p. 876). 
Additionally, the scientific view is that modernity, globalization, and SC are 
processes, i.e. series of related events rather than end states (Decker and Bolt, 
2005, p. 2427; Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock, 2006, p. 105; Jenson, 1998, p. 38; 
2002, p. 143). By implication, the scientific discourse speaks of degrees of SC, 
whereas the political discourse uses ‘SC’ disjunctively as something that can 
be definitively achieved or lost. Actual policies, however, most often deal 
with the processes that may lead to such extremes (Vergolini, 2011, p. 198). 
 
Both discourses assume two premises to which I now turn. Broadly, the 
absence of SC is deplored and raises concerns. SC “is most often discussed in 
terms of threats”, notes Jenson (2002, p. 142). I call this concern ‘the threat 
premise’, and it says that SC, however defined, is diminishing. This premise 
fuels SC arguments by generalizing the perception that political action is 
needed, thereby framing the argumentative setting in favor of change. 
 
The threat premise hinges on the belief that the referent of ‘SC’ literally exists 
‘out there’ – otherwise it would not make sense to assert that SC is threatened. 
I label this belief ‘the ontological realism premise’, which states that SC exists 
as a distinct entity upon which agents may act and that SC influences the 
workings of sociality. As I see it, this premise is frequently implied in the 
political discourse when policymakers are keen to promote SC, yet 
policymakers rarely unpack the notion (Jeannotte, 2000, p. 26). In contrast, the 
scientific discourse has engaged with the meaning of ‘SC’ to such an extent 
that a great many studies now propose revised definitions. Consequently, the 
literature has inspired several meta studies of SC (Chan, To, and Chan, 2006; 
Dickes, Valentova, and Borsenberger, 2009; Friedkin, 2004; Janmaat, 2011; 
Lafaye, 2009; Noll, 2002). However, the ontology of SC has received scarce 
attention. This blind spot is notable since common sense holds that SC is – 
and by implication exists as – ‘the glue that holds society together’ (Capshaw, 
2005, p. 53; Decker and Bolt, 2005, p. 2448; Hannan, 1999, p. 6; Sterk and 
Kushner, 2005, p. 1). However, this is merely a picturesque metaphor that 
affirms the ontological realism premise. It affirms that SC is but does not say 
what it is. Since both discourses assert the threat premise, they also imply the 
ontological realism premise, and this dependency underscores the need for a 
clear idea of what SC really is. The undisputed status of SC as a given good is, 
however, an obstacle to assessing its meaning and use. I therefore provide a 
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detailed literature review in the following section in order to trace common 
denominators in conceptions of SC. 
 
3. The meaning of ‘SC’ 
Below, I will map the meaning of ‘SC’ in the scientific discourse. There are 
several conceptual studies of SC in the scientific discourse whereas ‘SC’ 
appears with a quasi-fixed meaning in the political discourse. Generally, 
political agents use ‘SC’ as a truism, as if everyone knows its meaning – but 
no one explicates it. In contrast, conceptual studies – and controversies – are 
common in the literature. One might dismiss such conflict-loaded concepts as 
semantic delusions, but it is naïve to interpret the conflict in the scientific 
discourse as mere word play. It is, rather, evidence of a politico-scientific 
struggle, not only about the right to define SC and the authority to lead 
research but also about the political power to frame social phenomena, which 
is a prerequisite for effective SC arguments. 
 
One should thus note that the scientific discourse is founded upon a 
terminological twist of translation originating in Durkheim. The twist 
continues to shape the use and study of SC and moreover mirrors two 
competing interpretations of sociality. This foundation is relevant to the 
understanding of contemporary SC arguments, because it shows an 
ambiguous core in the reasoning of SC arguments. Specifically, it shows that 
both the threat premise and the ontological realism premise are integral to 
usage of SC. 
 
3.1. Theoretical foundations 
This section looks at the historiography on ‘SC’, which sees Durkheim as the 
“intellectual origin” (Chan, To, and Chan, 2006, p. 275) of the concept (Jenson, 
1998, p. v; Noll, 2002, p. 54; Rajulton, Ravanera, and Beaujot, 2007, p. 462; 
Ultee, 2006, p. 386). Durkheim was shaped by the French intellectual 
environment of the late-19th century, in which the positivist idea of an 
independent social reality flourished (Joseph, 2003). Durkheim captured this 
esprit de temps in his concept of faits sociale, i.e. social facts existing as 
independent entities external to agents over which they exercise coercive 
powers (Hamilton, 1990, p. 60; Keat and Urry, 1975, p. 60). For him, SC was 
merely a social fact, which shows a historical link to the ontological realism 
premise. Durkheim, however, did not use the French counterpart to 
‘cohesion’ (‘cohésion’). Historiographers usually refer to Durkheim’s work De 
la division de la travail social (1893) in which he consistently speaks of ‘solidarité 
sociale’. Standardized translations later changed ‘solidarité’ to ‘cohesion’. 
 
This alteration is unfortunate because the terms connote a threshold between 
two views on sociality. While ‘cohesion’ is rooted in the Latin verb ‘cohaerere’ 
(to cling together), ‘solidarité’ stems from the Latin noun ‘solidus’ (an 
undivided whole). Thus, ‘solidarité sociale’ refers to society qua entirety or 
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oneness as an object of preservation (Joseph, 2003, p. 68). Starting from the 
premise that sociality should mirror solidus, modern political discourse 
extends this view by seeking to secure societal unification in light of 
perceived disintegrating threats; i.e. to glue increasingly separate individuals 
together in times of globalization and mass immigration. Solidus thereby 
seems to underpin right-wing projects, such as the DPP, which insist on the 
preservation of a particular unity (e.g. a nation, people, or race). Conversely, 
coherence evokes an idea of sociality qua the political unification of originally 
atomized parts. In the cohésion view, unified sociality is a construct imposed 
on the dispersed pre-sociality by political endeavor, such as the Hobbesian 
unification of separately rational but collectively violent individuals who 
socialize themselves for protection under a sovereign. A modern example is 
the EU’s system of regional funds, which is based on the idea that resource 
redistribution strengthens the EU’s social linking value (read: glue). This 
primacy of separate individuals and rational cooperation tailors the cohesion 
view to liberal preferences. 
 
The distinction between seeing sociality via its parts or as a sum extends into 
both contemporary discourses. On the one hand, the scientific discourse 
asserts that policies may construct SC (Berger-Schmitt, 2002, p. 410; Easterly, 
Ritzen, and Woolcock, 2006, p. 116) – and should do so (Taylor-Goby 2012). It 
thus exports policy guidelines on how to create coherence and social glue to 
the political discourse. On the other hand, the political discourse uses ‘SC’ to 
refer to an abstract goal of unity and the conservation of solidus as an end in 
itself (Hooghe, 2007, p. 713). 
 
This shows that the political discourse draws on both solidus and cohaerere in 
SC arguments. The result is an essential ambiguity in the concept of SC, which 
allows it to harbor divergent political projects, such as the liberal EU and the 
nationalist-conservative DPP. In my view, this ambiguity may explain why 
the literature fails to delimit the concept of SC as the next section shows. 
 
3.2. Two research phases 
I will now introduce a distinction between two chronological research phases. 
The first phase is characterized by efforts to identify the constituency of SC 
and offers limited consensus on the meaning of ‘SC’. The second phase takes 
insights from the first – evident via references – and proceeds to what I call 
‘conceptual infrastructure’: the origins, development, and interplay of the 
constituents of SC. 
 
The first phase begins with Jenson’s 1998 study. She identifies five socio-
political dimensions of SC: belonging and isolation, inclusion and exclusion, 
participation and non-involvement, recognition and rejection of values, and 
legitimacy and illegitimacy of institutions. Scholars have since held that a set 
of dimensions defines ‘SC’. However, although Jenson does not systematize, 
prioritize, or develop the dimensions, one can see the dimensions as binary 
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schemes, with the first part of each conjunction referring to the political goods 
of SC and the second part denoting their threats. Jenson thus implicitly 
incorporates the threat premise at the level of definition. Bernard (1999) 
expands Jenson’s map with a sixth dimension, equality and inequality, but 
according to Berger-Schmitt (2002, pp. 408–10), the six dimensions are 
reducible to two “inherent” dimensions of SC, i.e. an inequality dimension 
(social exclusion, lack of resources and opportunities) and a social capital 
dimension (social relations and quality of institutions). Seeing a set of 
dimensions as “constituent” of SC, Kearns and Forrest (2006, p. 996) follow 
this lead. They emphasize civic culture and territorial belonging but basically 
extend Jenson’s approach. Duhaime et al. (2004) downgrade the dimensions 
from constituents to “indices” of SC. They propose to add demographic 
structures (e.g. age composition) but offer no hint as to what these are indices 
of. They thus mirror the ontological premise by focusing on phenomena that 
indicate the existence of something called ‘SC’ without saying what exists. 
Noll (2002) proposes a similar shift with his argument that SC is not property 
of the individual but is instead an inter-subjective entity. In effect, this is a 
shift in perspective from cohaerere to solidus. Consequently, Noll (2002, p. 57) 
advances three “levels of manifestation” of SC: interpersonal relations, 
intermediary relations (e.g. clubs and communities), and formal institutions. 
However, he omits a central issue: He does not say what is manifest at the 
levels of manifestation, with the result that he too exemplifies the ontological 
realism premise. 
 
In summary, the first phase holds that SC exists and is defined and 
constituted by dimensions, but one finds disagreement about the specific 
dimensions and their theoretical status. The first phase is justificatorily vague 
since the studies give few reasons as to why a given dimension should be 
included or excluded. They depart from the ontological realism premise, 
sometimes with reference to the threat premise, but tend to circumvent the 
meaning of ‘SC’. SC is thus a free-floating concept lacking a supportive, 
conceptual infrastructure. 
 
The second phase begins with Friedkin’s (2004) thorough review of the 
literature on SC. Assuming that SC consists of both attitudes and behavior, 
Friedkin argues that SC is a multidimensional phenomenon and therefore 
needs multiple indicators. In a critical remark (2004, p. 412), he claims that if 
some of the dimensions of SC “are causal antecedents or consequences of 
others, then they should be distinguished as such in a causal model and not 
lumped together as indicators”. He therefore calls for an exploration of the 
“causal interrelationships” between the dimensions in order to identify 
“antecedent, intervening, or outcome variables” (2004, p. 421). He shows how 
the second phase builds on the first but also enquires into conceptual 
infrastructure. Moreover, he expands the notion of SC by arguing that it 
requires that individuals actually do something since SC is more than just 
attitudes. Certain patterns of behavior, like donating to charity, are thus 
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integral to SC, he claims (2004, pp. 413). This behaviorist expansion of SC is 
reflected in later studies (Chan, To, and Chan, 2006; Rajulton, Ravanera, and 
Beaujot, 2006). However, Friedkin does not clarify the relation between 
constituents, i.e. the causality between attitudinal states of mind and 
behavioral states of affairs. Similarly, Dekker and Bolt (2005, p. 2449) claim 
that in SC, “one dimension often goes hand-in-hand” with SC “in another 
dimension”, which suggests a kind of interconnectedness, but they do not 
explain how the dimensions are connected. Later, one finds a different 
infrastructure in Rajulton, Ravanera, and Beaujot (2006, p. 463), who claim 
that the dimensions of SC, which they borrow from Jenson/Bernard, should 
be systematized into three “domains” of political goods: political (voting and 
volunteering), economic (occupation, income, labor force participation), and 
social (e.g. interactions and neighborhood-based help). 
 
In short, the second phase deals with conceptual infrastructure, particularly 
the idea that dimensions are sets of antecedents and consequents ordered by 
causal connections. This makes it an empirical exercise to portray the 
infrastructure, and the resultant methodological consensus is that SC consists 
of subjective attitudes, which requires consulting the individual (e.g. value 
surveys), and objective behavior, which requires observing the individual 
(e.g. measuring community activity). Debate persists, however, with regards 
to identifying the actual attitudes and patterns of behavior that constitute SC. 
 
I furthermore wish to emphasize three trends in the literature that have 
merged with the political discourse. First, the literature widens the extension 
of ‘SC’ in the sense of incorporating a growing number of constituents of SC, 
but it nonetheless builds on the a priori assumption that SC is exhausted in 
any of the given sets of dimensions. Second, it asserts the existence of SC as a 
distinct entity that encompasses and includes the dimensions and thereby 
reflects the ontological realism premise. Third, it unanimously assumes that 
SC carries positive normative value as a political phenomenon. Consequently, 
it holds that SC properly defined is universally applicable – despite varying 
geographical or cultural contexts. Chan and Chan (2006, p. 640) neatly sum up 








Cells A-D define ‘SC’, showing that SC arguments may target a highly diverse 
range of social phenomena by virtue of its dual-constituency as attitudinal 
states of mind and behavioral states of affairs. Horizontal relations signify 
social relations between members of society, and vertical relations signify 
relations between the state and the individual. Cell A thus consists of trust 
 Attitudes Behavior 
Horizontal relations A B 
Vertical relations C D 
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and shared values, Cell B covers collective tendencies (e.g. voluntary work, 
helping strangers, etc.); Cell C marks a cognitive collective (e.g. a sense of 
belonging, national identity, and perceptions of the governing bodies’ 
legitimacy); and cell D covers voting, political participation, willingly paying 
taxes, and the lack of social fraud. The reasoning is that the more society is 
characterized by these political goods, the more SC it possesses. 
 
Due to chosen scope, I do not unpack the matrix any further. My purpose is 
only to illustrate that SC, according to the literature, is a normative notion of 
causally connected constituents. This view travels to the political discourse 
and legitimizes concerns over threats to SC since it affirms the existence of SC 
as a political good. Arguments based on ‘the glue that holds society together’ 
thereby gain scientific credibility. 
 
4. The functions of SC arguments 
I believe that this back-up function of science raises a question as to the 
function of SC in these discourses: What impacts do SC arguments have on 
liberal democracy? To answer this question, I assess below SC in both 
discourses, first briefly as a conceptual tool in the scientific discourse, then in 
more detail as a policy goal in the political. I split this section into two parts to 
show how the discourses converge. 
 
4.1. Vis-à-vis scientific discourse 
The function of SC in the scientific discourse is a product of both research 
phases, and it is shaped by the definitional enlargement of SC. In effect, SC 
becomes an all-encompassing term that begs the question: What is SC not? As 
Chan, To, and Chan (2004, p. 280) note, “the informative nature of a concept 
depends on how much it excludes, not how much it includes”. Yet research 
focuses on inclusion. It holds that SC is an attribute of sociality, but the 
problem arises when ‘SC’, as an umbrella term, becomes indiscernible from 
‘sociality’ itself. It appears that the discourse thus identifies the subject 
(sociality) with its attribute (SC), but from this article’s practical perspective, it 
is more important to note that one cannot then know into which phenomena 
social scientists are enquiring – that is, if studies using ‘SC’ also share 
referents. This clouds the scientific discourse as well as confuses policymakers 
looking to science for advice. Due to this fundamental slipperiness, SC 
arguments cannot escape an initial obscurity. 
 
However, the scientific discourse shows a tendency to hold that the meaning 
of ‘SC’ is exhausted in the given definitions. Ironically, it is also aware of its 
lack of clarity, which even predates the political use of ‘SC’. Mudrack (1989) 
saw “a legacy of confusion” in SC. Earlier, Mitchel (1979, p. 180) mentioned 
that SC has “no generally agreed upon meaning”. And recently, Malutas and 
Malouta (2004, p. 450) labeled SC as “a problem of ‘denotativeness’” – that 
‘SC’ only denotes scientists’ own mental constructs. This problem may be a 
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result of not treating constituents and conditions of SC as conceptually 
distinct entities. An exclusive definition of ‘SC’ should thus not include 
conditions or values that promote or enable SC. When researchers focus on 
indices of SC, as in the first research phase, SC is defined as ‘that which occurs 
if X’. For example, Duhaime et al. (2004, p. 301) define SC as “structured by 
access to formal economic and governmental institutions [… and] access to 
family and community-based, face-to-face relations”. Yet it is unclear why SC 
should be defined as such access even if it may be relevant to promote SC. 
Likewise, by defining SC through a set of moral values that promote it, 
Friedkin (2004, p. 412) makes the following proposition: ‘SC is that which is 
fostered if people believe X’. Both cases illustrate that the scientific discourse 
shuns the meaning of SC itself at the same time as it asserts that SC exists ‘out 
there’ in the social as a fact and as a universal ideal for certain patterns of 
behavior and attitudes. 
 
This article does not seek to solve such methodological puzzles, but I want to 
stress that in my reading of the scientific discourse, I have found that it is far 
from trivial to assume that SC is a given good in political arguments. The 
point is political, not metaphysical: I am not concerned with how SC exists but 
rather with what is said to exist since it defines options available to 
policymakers. As the next section shows, this is important because the 
complexity and normative connotations of SC fuse with politics. 
 
4.2. Vis-à-vis political discourse 
The fusion of SC with politics is evident in SC arguments. Its political function 
should thus be seen in relation to the conclusions reached. Broadly speaking, 
SC arguments aim to justify cohesion policies (cf. Fenger 2012). By ‘cohesion 
policy’, I mean a political recommendation, measure, or action aimed at 
strengthening or protecting SC, whether official policies or informal debates. I 
argue below that the use of SC raises three problems that question the value 
of cohesion policies to liberal democracy. 
 
The first problem is one of looseness. It stems from the lack of a stable 
meaning of ‘SC’ and is connected to the use of ‘SC’ in the scientific discourse. 
The problem can be illustrated by imagining two distinct social phenomena, S 
and P. Say a policymaker sees S as a problem for P and that she uses ‘SC’ to 
describe P. Further imagine that she declares S to be a threat to P, which by 
virtue of SC is a political good, and that action Q therefore ought to be taken 
to alleviate S. The risk is now that the meaning of ‘SC’, given the multiplicity 
of interpretations and vagueness of definitions, transcends P and thus that Q 
encompasses too many phenomena. That makes it difficult for people – voters 
in liberal democracies – to evaluate what Q is actually aimed at since it is 
possible to stress one dimension of SC in one context and prefer a different 
dimension in a another context. By blurring the end of political actions, the 
elasticity of SC arguments makes it hard to hold policymakers accountable. 
Chan and Chan’s above matrix is a testament to this risk. 
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Yet concepts like SC attract policymakers. This is because they are flexible 
enough to harbor the necessities of day-to-day political action and hence 
appeal to different audiences (Bernard, 1999, p. 48; Maloutas and Malouta, 
2004, p. 450). In other words, SC has policy appeal by virtue of its looseness 
and status of political good while simultaneously seeming analytically unfit 
for this role. That makes it a potent political weapon. SC is flexible enough to 
meet most popular demands, giving policymakers in search of support an 
easy retreat from detailed deliberation. SC arguments therefore challenge 
liberal democracy to the extent that liberal democracy thrives on deliberation, 
making it preferable to act on reasonable justifications. The problem of 
looseness, then, is that SC allows one to interpret almost any development as 
a threat to SC while almost any action may be framed as productive to SC. In 
a society convinced that SC is a given good, such political communication 
may, from a liberal democratic perspective, be too successful in escaping the 
commitment of pros and cons. 
 
The second problem is the de-legitimization of dissent. To the extent that 
liberal democracy is not about agreement but about the right to express 
dissent (Helly, 2002, p. 15), there is a problem: Liberal democratic politics 
without dissent is an empty gesture since there is no point in consulting the 
electorate if the outcome – nurturing SC – is fixed. Additionally, SC 
arguments clash with egalitarianism as they “don’t aim at recognizing social 
protests, or promoting a more egalitarian sharing of power” (Helly, 2003, p. 
24). While egalitarian concerns appear in the political discourse, they are 
subordinated to concerns over the total level of SC. Thus, SC arguments often 
imply that certain groups can be the target of specific aid or affirmative action 
only if the efforts contribute to societal cohesion. The problem is thus that if SC 
is indisputably good, if not best, then SC arguments are immune to critical 
enquiry (Kearns and Forrest, 2000, p. 998). Such arguments in effect hinder 
the practice of liberal politics in the sense of ongoing critique of social affairs 
and block proposals for new fundamentals of political struggle (Diken and 
Laustsen, 2004). 
 
This problem stems from the observation that the meaning of ‘SC’ 
approximates ‘good society’ in the political discourse. Justifications for 
cohesion policies thus resemble tautologies: One should promote a good 
society because it is good. Correspondingly, policies contrary to SC are 
predefined as bad. However, anything can be framed into contrariness given 
the opacity of SC, and it becomes difficult to disagree with SC arguments – 
anyone against good society? Unlikely though that may be, cohesion policies 
seem inappropriate for dealing with all political issues, such as the underlying 
distribution of power and recognition that determine the social distribution of 
goods and rights. A liberal democracy committed to serving the needs of its 
citizens qua individuals, not merely as a single social body, should thus 
recognize the limits of cohesion policies and weigh SC issues against 
competing concerns such as social justice (e.g. Boucher 2013), recognition (e.g. 
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Juul 2010), and solidarity (e.g. Vasta 2010). I do not enter details here as I am 
more concerned with the overall function of SC arguments. 
 
This brings me to the third problem of social oneness. In so far as politics also 
concerns struggles for representations of social phenomena (e.g. a rise in 
Eastern European workers), SC is a notion of political battle (Peters, 2010). 
The battle is fought in both discourses, where the power to define what makes 
the social cohere is co-extensional with the power to exclude opinions 
contrary to SC. This means that cohesion policies may work as an informal 
exclusion of political ends contrary to the overarching desirability of the given 
ideal of SC. The Council of Europe’s book series Trends in Social Cohesion 
illustrates this approach to politics: “Deconstructing firmly anchored 
differences [...] is the only reasonable way towards a shared management of 
the transformations currently taking place [in the EU]” (Farrel and Oliveri, 
2006, p. 24). One thus finds a near contradiction in terms when a liberal 
democratic institution promotes SC by dismantling differences rather than by 
including diversity on the basis of liberal respect for unique individuals. 
 
I also want to draw attention to the attitudinal aspect of SC. Cohesion policies 
are not only about creating certain institutions or welfare objects but also 
imply that citizens confirm the set of values in SC. This requires, for instance, 
that there should be a high level of trust, that people commit to society, and 
that they are glued together and to the state by a sense of belonging. In short, 
cohesion policies regulate what people do as well as feel by a near-hegemonic 
value set. The oneness problem is then that the values implied by SC should 
be subject to debate in liberal democracy and not merely affirmed by social 
science as the proper form for sociality. And liberals may have further 
worries. The normative attitudinal core of SC allows policymakers to cross a 
threshold usually considered hands-off by liberals, that is, the sphere of 
privacy that secures citizens’ freedom of thought. 
 
This means that cohesion policies fueled by SC arguments alter the 
relationship between states and citizens, who, in order to attain SC, must 
enter into an emotional relationship with the state and commit (not just 
submit) themselves to a given normative version of sociality. The creation of 
the glue that holds society together, for proponents of SC, thus requires a 
collective oneness in terms of values and attitudes, i.e. the solidus. This 
contrasts with rational relationships favored by many liberals in line with the 
social contract tradition, according to which individuals with different 
interests but with a mutual need for security formalize the establishment of 
social order out of rational calculi. This kind of order tolerates any attitude 
that does not counter the maintenance of the resulting order. In contrast, SC 
arguments both aspire to regulate actions and to align attitudes as a certain 
affective attachment to the state and between its members. Liberal democracy 
was, however, invented to allow for the co-existence of divergent ways and 
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views of life (Israel, 2011, p. 53), and cohesion policies challenge this goal 
through their preoccupation with solidus. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The above shows that SC has a troubling function in relation to liberal 
democracy. It leads a dual life in two intertwined discourses that mutually 
define its function as a conceptually indeterminate yet universal political 
good in arguments for cohesion policies. This function may be reconstructed 
in a general SC argument: 
 
(1) SC exists 
(2) SC should exist 
(3) SC is threatened 
(4) Therefore, cohesion policies should be enacted. 
 
Each step connects to the points I have dealt with. Step 1 reflects the 
ontological realism premise, which is justified by the body of affirmative 
studies in the scientific discourse. Step 2 expresses the status of SC as a given 
good. As the political value of SC is consensually assumed, this step is rarely 
made explicit. Step 3 mirrors the threat premise, which – usually without 
argument – is asserted as a conventional perception in the political discourse. 
It is justified by the framing of a phenomenon as incompatible with SC, such 
as the influx of Eastern European workers in the introductory example. Step 4 
concludes that cohesion polices should be enacted to mitigate the perceived 
threat. 
 
This reasoning poses three problems to liberal democracy. First, the 
conceptual looseness of SC, which is a consequence of the lack of clear 
definitions in the scientific discourse, means that political communication in 
terms of SC is misleading to the electorate and that SC arguments can support 
virtually any action in the absence of the quality control of deliberation in 
liberal democracy. Second, since SC appears as a champion of political ends, it 
immunizes cohesion policies to critique, which contradicts the recognition of 
dissent in liberal democracy. Furthermore, it subordinates other liberal 
concerns – e.g. issues of egalitarianism and distribution of rights – by shifting 
focus from individuals to the social body. Third, the aspiration to create a 
social oneness implies that cohesion policies target citizens’ behavior as well 
as attitudes and thus enter the sphere of individual privacy, which is 
traditionally safeguarded by liberal democracy. To the extent that liberal 
democracy politically emancipates citizens, subjects of cohesion policies may 
thus be said to be de-emancipated through a strangely non-liberal and 
coercive kind of cohesion. 
 
I conclude that these problems give liberals reason to question the idea of a 
cohesive glue holding society together. It is, rather, corrosive to liberal 
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democracy. It is thus peculiar that liberal democracies seem particularly eager 
to pursue cohesion polices, creating a contradiction between practiced and 
official ideals, blurring the political trajectory, and making it hard to hold 
policymakers accountable. 
 
Let me add a final remark on the scope and impact of this conclusion. SC is a 
certain design of social order, but my argument does not exclude concerns for 
social order. It instead states that SC harbors its own conceptual problems and 
that the kind of social order advanced in SC arguments confronts liberal 
values. The conceptual issue calls for the scientific discourse to elaborate on 
the ontological realism premise and rework the analytical framework of SC. 
In light of the threat premise, the political issues imply a need for further 
normative debate on the worth of SC and its relation to other liberal values. 
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